Abstract What I call "strategic injustice" involves a set of formal and informal regulatory rules and conventions that often lead to grossly unfair outcomes for a class of individuals despite their resistance. My goal in this paper is to provide the necessary conditions for such injustices and for eliminating their instances from our social practices. To do so, I follow Peter Vanderschraaf's (2018) analysis of circumstances of justice with special attention to the "reciprocal restraining conditions" that are necessary for a rough equality in fair division problems. I expand his account by embedding iterated "asymmetric conflictual coordination games" that summarize fair division problems in a social network. I use the network effect on such coordination games to explain the emergence of stable exploitative behavior and conventions by a class of individuals even in the presence of restraining efforts by others. I conclude that such unfair conventions are resilient to uncoordinated individual actions and interventions. In fact, maintaining a rough equality itself turns into another coordination problem. Finally, I show that something similar to a social movement that restructures the network of social relations is necessary to solve such coordination problem.
Abstract Frank Jackson (1991) proposes an interpretation of consequentialism, namely, the Decision Theoretic Consequentialism (DTC), which provides a middle ground between internal and external criteria of rightness inspired by decision theory. According to DTC, a right decision either leads to the best outcomes (external element) or springs from right motivations (internal element). He raises an objection to fully external interpretations, like objective consequentialism (OC), which he claims that DTC can resolve. He argues that those interpretations are either too objective, which prevents them from giving guidance for action, or their guidance leads to wrong and blameworthy actions or decisions. I discuss how the emphasis on blameworthiness in DTC constraints its domain to merely the justification of decisions that relies on rationality to provide a justification criterion for moral decisions. I provide examples that support the possibility of rational but immoral decisions that are at odds with DTC’s prescription for right decisions. Moreover, I argue what I call the desire-luck problem for the external element of justification criterion leads to the same objection for DTC that Jackson raised for OC. Therefore, DTC, although successful in response to some objections, fails to provide a prescription for the right decision.
Heydari Fard, S. (forthcoming/2023), Violence in Non-Violent Protesting, Review of The Philosophy of Protest, by Jennifer Kling and Megan Mitchell for Philosophy in the Contemporary World.
Edited Volumes
Co-editor with Andrew Fiala, (forthcoming/2023) Peace and Hope in Dark Times, the Philosophy of Peace Series, BRILL.
Heydari Fard, S. (forthcoming/2023) "Hoping With," inPeace and Hope in Dark Times, the Philosophy of Peace Series, BRILL.
Abstract In this paper, I argue that the proper interpretation of a collectivist hope requires attention to the people we hope with. I follow Michelle Moody-Adams conviction that visionaries and intellectuals of constructive social movements ground political hope in collectives rather than individuals as Western political philosophy tends to do. However, I show that in addition to the content or subjective features, our theoretical and normative discussions of hope should constitute our relations of hope. I ground this discussion both in Western modern political thought and in non-violent movements and heir subsequent philosophy.
“Diversity, Polarization, and Dynamic Structures: A Structural Turn in Social Contract Theory,” in an edited volume titled New Approaches to Social Contract Theory: Liberty, Equality, Diversity, and the Open Society.
Abstract In this paper, I argue in favor of a structural turn in social contract theory. More precisely, I argue that dealing with the complex and dynamic nature of the social world requires an emphasis on social structures greater than what contractarians often consider. I take structures to be the dynamic and non-random networks of interdependence among all active components that shape society. I also constrain my focus to a growing body of literature on diversity that explores plausible contractarian alternatives given the complexity of modern societies. I argue that shifting weight from diversity to structures in theorizing alternative contractarian frameworks would be an improvement.
“The Transformative Power of Social Movements,” Philosophy Compass, (Under Review).
“Race, Gender, and Social Explanation.” (Under Review)
